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Abstract: Montgomery v Lanarkshire HB is a deeply troubling decision when read closely. 
Paradoxically, its ruling supporting the principle of autonomy could be justified only by disregarding 
the individual patient’s actual choices and characteristics in favour of a stereotype. The decision 
demonstrates a lack of expertise in dealing with specific clinical issues and (mis)represents 
professional guidance. More fundamentally, it fails to appreciate the nature of professional 
expertise. This calls into question the competence of the courts to adjudicate on matters of clinical 
judgement and makes an attractive formulation of the test for disclosure obligations inherently 
unpredictable. 
 
 
  
 
Like most legal cases, the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire HB [1] 
can be considered on a number of different levels. This paper argues that it is a deeply troubling 
decision when it is read closely, with a view to understanding the interplay between findings of fact 
and law and with an eye for its practical implications. On such a reading, the decision reveals a 
counter-productively reductionist understanding of the nature of professional expertise. In addition, 
the way in which the Supreme Court deals with clinical decision-making and its (mis)representation 
of professional guidance calls into question the suitability of the forensic process to provide 
objective scrutiny. In short, the argument is that the decision demonstrates both a lack of expertise 
in dealing with specific clinical issues and, more fundamentally, a failure to appreciate the nature of 
professional expertise. This piece defers consideration of the legal doctrine to the conclusion 
because its focus is on what can be leant from the Montgomery judgments (at the various stages 
of the litigation) about the competence of the courts to adjudicate on clinical judgement. We 
suggest that the foundations of the decision are fundamentally flawed and that any appraisal of the 
ruling needs to take this into account. If this argument holds, then the implications of the decision 
for the legal regulation of clinical judgment are more radical and more wide-ranging than the Court 
claims. The longstanding pattern of English law showing respect for clinical judgement has been 
replaced by judicial intervention in a manner that makes the legal principles that the case 
establishes inherently unpredictable in application. 
 
Three anxieties 
 
There are three strands to the analysis on which this conclusion rests. The first concerns the 
construction of the relationship between the claimant and her doctor. The most common 
interpretation of the decision seems to have been that it is a triumph for patient autonomy over 
medical paternalism [2, 3]..However, it could only be reached by rejecting the account of the lower 
courts of the claimant as an intelligent, educated, articulate, independent and well supported 
woman. Instead, the Supreme Court adopted a stereotype of an intimidated patient as the 
foundation of its decision. It is paradoxical that a ruling supporting the principle of autonomy could 
be justified only by disregarding the actual patient’s characteristics and the choices that she had 
made. This turned on a finding of fact. It is unusual for an appeal court to reject a finding of fact by 
the trial judge, who had the opportunity to hear the woman’s evidence and make an assessment of 
her capacity and credibility. Yet, the Supreme Court was content to do so, just as it was content to 
find that the doctor who had been regarded by the trial judge as caring and responsive was in fact 
deceitful and ideologically driven. This creates considerable uncertainty for the future; clinicians 
seeking to avoid legal liability need to guess how their understanding of the clinical circumstances 
might be rewritten by judges. 
 
The second strand of argument concerns the Court’s treatment of the evidence base for decisions 
about maternity care, including the interpretation of clinical guidelines. The account of the clinical 
options that was provided by the Supreme Court suppressed information about the risks of 
caesarian section, raising questions about its grasp of the evidence. It also failed to address the 
fact that such an operation would have been outside the clinical guidelines issued by the Royal 
College of Obstetricians Gynaecologists (RCOG). This raises questions about either its 
understanding of, or its respect for, evidence-based practice. It relied upon, but significantly 
oversimplified, the advice given by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). 
This raises questions about the wisdom of extracting words from such guidance out of context as if 
they were legal instruments. The Supreme Court’s decision on liability turned on the fact that the 
claimant should have been offered a caesarean section in circumstances in which the collective 
wisdom of the clinical community, as enshrined in RCOG and NICE guidelines, did not suggest it 
was indicated. A clinician seeking to avoid legal liability can therefore no longer regard compliance 
with professional guidelines as a protection but must consider which aspects will be accepted by 
the judiciary and which not. 
 
The third problematic aspect of the decision concerns the Supreme Court’s disaggregation of 
clinical decisions into different categories, to be judged against different legal standards. This 
raises two distinct sets of difficulties. The first relates to how to determine into which category of 
expertise a decision falls, and once this is done how to assess compliance with the required 
standard of care. The decision is ambiguous on the former and on the latter its discussion is limited 
to matters of disclosure, leaving it unclear how to assess other categories of judgements where the 
decision is not ‘purely’ medical. Like the earlier concerns, this raises issues of certainty and 
predictability. This is exacerbated by a divergence between legal and clinical conceptions of 
professional expertise. Work on the nature of expertise that has been highly influential in health 
professional education sees the transition from ‘novice’ to ‘expert’ as lying in the ability to move 
beyond the breaking down of decisions into separate components by developing the capacity to 
make holistic judgments [4]. The Montgomery decision requires the opposite process. It passes 
judgement on a holistic decision as if it was a set of separate questions, each addressed 
individually according to different criteria (albeit as yet not all determined). The twin aspects of this 
third area of concern about Montgomery thus raise epistemological questions about professional 
knowledge and expertise.  
 
The law has not previously needed to grapple with these because they were deferred to the sphere 
of clinical decision-making by the use of the Bolam test, which operates by reinforcing holistic peer 
assessments. Judicial oversight has been limited to cases where there are clear illogicalities [5]. 
However, if the ‘black box’ of clinical judgment is to be opened in litigation, they will now need to be 
addressed in the courts. This is a new and radical challenge for lawyers. If the first two strands of 
our argument are well founded, the Montgomery decision suggests that the courts are ill-equipped 
for this role. 
 
 
Infantilising the patient, demonizing the doctor  
 
 
The Supreme Court Justices presented the doctor's assessment of what to tell the claimant as 
ideologically driven:  
'a judgment that vaginal delivery is in some way morally preferable to a caesarean section: 
so much so that it justifies depriving the pregnant woman of the information needed for her 
to make a free choice in the matter' [1, para 114].  
They judged that information was deliberately withheld precisely because the doctor knew that if 
she had raised the risk of shoulder dystocia causing harm to the baby the woman 'would have no 
doubt requested a caesarean' [1, para 19]. However, this demonization of the doctor is difficult to 
reconcile with the account of the clinical decision-making and interactions between woman and 
obstetrician that is given by the lower courts. The Supreme Court’s argument also only works by 
playing down the autonomy of Nadine Montgomery, in effect infantilising her by treating her as 
intimidated despite lack of any evidence to support this. These characterisations of the 
protagonists were essential to the Supreme Court’s reasoning on the disposal of the case, but they 
were reached without seeing the parties and without access to a full transcript of the evidence [1 
para 114]. According to the Inner Court of Sessions, the key statements from which the doctor’s 
supposed ideological commitment was identified were taken from a general discussion of 
professional practice not in relation to the pursuer as a particular individual [6 para 47], a point 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court but not addressed [1 para 36]. 
 
On this, and a number of other crucial points, the Supreme Court’s assessment of the facts was at 
variance from that made by the judge who heard the evidence. Whereas the Supreme Court 
suggested that the claimant’s ability to seek a caesarean section was obstructed by the doctor, the 
lower courts found that she always knew that it was an option [7 para 245, 6 para 40]. The trial 
judge’s understanding of the case was that the woman was a:  
‘highly intelligent person with a mother who is a doctor and a sister who is a doctor…. 
Looking to her evidence and the manner in which she gave it I do not think for a moment 
she would have accepted not getting the answers to questions that she was specifically 
putting to Dr Mclellan’ [7 para 246].  
He also considered that Mrs Montgomery was a woman in control who would have not have 
remained under Dr Mclellan’s care if she had not received answers to her questions [7 paras 246, 
250]. He found that ‘the view I have formed of the pursuer does not fit in with the picture she was 
seeking to present of what had passed between her and Dr McLellan at the various consultations’ 
[7 para 246]. So, his assessment was that Mrs Montgomery was satisfied with the care that she 
was getting and had chosen to trust in Dr McLellan’s advice. She had reached this position with 
the informed support of her own mother, who was a GP and who had attended an antenatal 
appointment with her daughter in order ‘to discuss the options for delivery, the plans for delivery, 
the plan of action’ [7 para 49]. The lower courts seem to have concluded that they were dealing 
with a highly competent woman who was seeking to rewrite history when her autonomous choices 
were followed by a tragedy.   
 
The Supreme Court, in contrast, fell back onto a stereotype based on  
‘the social and psychological realities of the relationship between a patient and her 
doctor…. Few patients do not feel intimidated or inhibited to some degree’ [1 para 58]. 
This enabled the Court to hold that it did not matter whether or not Nadine Montgomery had asked 
questions. She had to be given the information that would have answered the questions she had 
not in fact asked. According to the Supreme Court, legal doctrine required this because expecting 
fuller information to be given to those who specifically sought it, as opposed to expressing general 
anxiety, was a  
‘reversal of logic: the more a patient knows… the easier it is for her to ask specific 
questions… but it is those who lack such knowledge …. who are in the greatest need of 
information’ [1 para 58]. 
 
When this approach was applied to the facts of the case, the decision became one about 
hypothetical patients rather than the actual claimant.: Thus the discussion is in general terms: ‘no 
woman would be likely to face the possibility of a fourth degree tear, a Zavonelli manoeuvre or a 
symphysiotomy with equanimity’ and ‘a patient in Mrs Montgomery’s position.’ Note, the actual Mrs 
Montgomery is not considered. This ‘position’ was presented by the Supreme Court as being a 
choice between these procedures and caesarean section, which it described as a virtually risk-free 
alternative (on which over-simplification, see below). The only recognition of Nadine Montgomery 
as an individual is in reference to her anxiety [1 para 94]. In order to justify a finding of liability, she 
is, thus, reduced by the Supreme Court from the ‘highly intelligent person’ who gave evidence to 
the trial judge [1 para 6] into an anxious patient, unable to ask about what she really wants to know 
[1 para 94]. 
 
The doctor probably did not see any specific informed consent issue at the time, separate from her 
general duties to care for the patient. She understood that she had to make a series of interrelated 
judgements about risk, clinical options and support of the woman during her pregnancy. To both 
the Lord Ordinary, Lord Bannatyne, and the Inner Court of Sessions, the main concern of the 
doctor was to respond to her patient’s anxiety:  
‘as it appeared to Dr McL, the pursuer simply needed reassurance that she would be able 
to manage a vaginal delivery, notwithstanding the size of her baby, failing which she was 
well aware that an elective caesarean section could be undertaken instead’ [6 para 37].  
They found it unsurprising that she therefore offered reassurance (and noted that even the 
pursuer’s expert found that this response was acceptable) [6 para 40].  
 
The judges cited with approval Dr McLellan’s comment that ‘any patient about to undergo surgery 
who expressed general anxiety about anaesthetics would normally require reassurance rather than 
an explicit confirmation of the risk of death’ [6 para 41]. The Inner Court of Sessions noted that Dr 
McLellan had decided against offering a further ultrasound scan because she feared it would 
increase Nadine Montgomery’s anxiety. They present her response as empathetic rather than 
manipulative. They regarded it as  
‘incongruous to hold Dr McL … to have been under a legal duty to cause potentially greater 
alarm by discussing all the ways in which a vaginal delivery might go wrong…. the 
pursuer's argument … amounts to saying that, as a matter of law, neither reassurance, nor 
even deferment of a final decision, can qualify as available options for the treating doctor 
once a patient evinces any generalised anxiety or concern’ [6 para 41]. 
The trial judge also believed that Dr McLellan would have referred the pursuer to another 
consultant had an impasse been reached [7 para 258]. This too seems inconsistent with the 
suggestion that she was seeking to impose her views on Nadine Montgomery by withholding 
information. In contrast to the pursuer, Dr McLellan was found to be ‘credible and reliable’ in 
relation to the informed consent issue, an ‘impressive witness’ giving her evidence in a ‘clear, 
coherent and consistent manner’ [7 para 258]. There is no hint in these descriptions of the 
ideological drive that was ascribed to the doctor by the Supreme Court. 
 
 
Adjudication and the politics of evidence 
 
Concerns also arise about the Justices’ understanding of the clinical issues. The Supreme Court 
displayed a poor grasp of the risks and benefits of the procedures in question, and engaged 
inadequately with the guidelines drawn up to assist clinicians to make evidence-based decisions. 
Such professional guidance seeks to codify the best available evidence to help clinicians make 
decisions without being paralysed by having to reconsider all the literature in every clinical 
interaction and reducing the risk of bias or error in selecting treatment options and advising 
patients on the risks and benefits [8]. Within the NHS, the work of the NICE also seeks to establish 
guidance on best practice. In the absence of particular issues suggesting that a particular woman’s 
circumstances made the guidelines inapplicable, following them would seem responsible practice 
providing that they are not followed ‘slavishly’ and do not exclude the exercise of the professional’s 
clinical judgment [7 para 203].  
 
In line with professional guidelines, Dr Mclellan's approach was that it was not appropriate to offer 
CS unless there was a clinical indication. If one had emerged, she would have discussed it as an 
option. She relied upon clinical guidelines to assist her to assess whether a clinical indication was 
present. In the context of obstetrics, the most authoritative clinical guidance is generally regarded 
as that produced by the RCOG, sometimes in conjunction with the Royal College of Midwives, 
using the ‘Green Top’ brand to indicate those guidelines that have the strongest evidential 
foundations. The Montgomery case engaged such a guideline on Shoulder Dystocia [9]. That 
guidance advised that a caesarean section should be considered in relation to women with 
diabetes, such as Nadine Montgomery, where predicted birth weight exceeded 4.5kg [9 para 
5.1.2]. However, as the estimated fetal weight of Nadine Montgomery’s baby did not go above 
3.9kg, an elective caesarean was not indicated as an appropriate option for her if care was to 
follow the guidelines. This was the position taken by defence witnesses in respect of what ‘most 
obstetricians’ would do [7 para 70]. At least one of the experts called upon by the claimant explicitly 
accepted that ‘the guidelines were that a caesarean section should only be offered if the predicted 
weight was over 4.5kgs’ (emphasis added). [7 para 54]. On the facts, Dr McLellan had decided that 
this trigger weight should be adjusted downwards to 4kg to reflect Mrs Montgomery’s small statute, 
an adjustment that indicated that she was not following the guidance uncritically [1 para 15]. Even 
so, her estimate did not reach this weight. 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision was predicated on the assumption that a CS should have been 
available to Nadine Montgomery. Yet, Dr Mclellan’s view that this was not clinically appropriate, at 
the relevant point during her antenatal care, was supported clinical guidelines and experts on both 
sides. Given this, it can be seen that the Montgomery decision is hard to reconcile with the 
orthodox legal position in UK law, previously described by the Supreme Court in Aintree UH 
NHSFT v James as one of the ‘basic legal principles relating to medical treatment’, that decisions 
about whether it is appropriate to offer treatment are a matter for clinical not judicial assessment 
[10 paras 17-22]. The Court of Appeal confirmed this approach in R (Burke) v GMC, holding that it 
was acceptable that guidance on end of life care preserved this clinical discretion in relation to care 
that a patient was requesting [11]. It also seems to go far beyond the limited grounds set out in 
Bolitho for judges to override expert evidence in clinical negligence cases [5].  
 
It seems possible that the Justices’ appropriation of the jurisdiction to determine what was clinically 
indicated was the consequence of a misunderstanding by the Supreme Court of the evidence 
about risks related to the modes of delivery in childbirth and of the terms of the clinical guidelines. 
According to the Supreme Court, ‘the risk involved in an elective caesarean section, for the mother 
[is] extremely small and for the baby virtually non-existent’ and this was in stark contrast to those 
involved in vaginal delivery [1 para 94]. However, this is not consistent with the conclusions 
reached by NICE, which draws attention to a number of respects in which the relative risks to 
women involved in caesarean section are greater than those for vaginal delivery and which it 
advises should be drawn to the attention of women. These include the fact that it is almost five 
times as likely that a woman who has a CS, rather than a vaginal birth, will suffer a cardiac arrest 
and over twice as likely that they will need a hysterectomy due to post-partum haemorrhage. 
These relative risks of adverse outcomes are higher that the expectation of relative benefits [12 
Table 4.5]. These data are not directly relevant to the situation that Nadine Montgomery was 
facing, as they relate to women with uncomplicated pregnancies. However, even for women 
without complications, much of the data is of poor quality. In subsequent updated guidelines 
specifically related to women with diabetes, NICE has stated that the evidence is that caesarean 
section is associated with higher levels of complications and adverse outcomes than vaginal birth 
[13 para 6.1.1.6]. 
 
Further matters that might be of concern to women in deciding whether to elect for a caesarean 
section include significant implications for subsequent reproductive health. NICE draws attention to 
a 46% increase in the probability that a woman who has had a caesarean section, compared with 
those who have a vaginal birth, will have no more children within five years of the operation, and 
an increased relative risk of maternal mortality and stillbirth in subsequent pregnancies [12 Part 
11]. The guidance on communicating the risks of caesarean section issued by the RCOG draws 
attention to a series of issues that should be explained to women. They include one such adverse 
outcome stated to be as likely to materialise as the shoulder dystocia was said to be for Nadine 
Montgomery. This is 9% risk of ‘persistent wound and abdominal discomfort in the first few months 
after surgery’ [14]. This is a probability of directly experienced harm, in contrast to shoulder 
dystocia, which does not always lead to adverse outcomes and where the risk of harm was said to 
be relatively small.  
 
It seems clear that the Supreme Court based its decision on a significant oversimplification of the 
evidence on risk, a factor which calls into question the basis on which it assessed the situation. In 
particular the Supreme Court’s rejection of the finding of the trial judge that Mrs Montgomery would 
not have decided to choose a caesarean section had the risks been explained to her seems to 
have been based on these misconceptions about the risks associated with caesarean section [7 
para 267, 1 para 35]. It is not certain that Mrs Montgomery would have been appropriately warned 
about the risks of CS, as a national audit has shown that communication of them is haphazard in 
practice [15]. Nevertheless, the decision that she would have needed to make would not have 
been straightforward. She would have needed to consider whether to take these significant risks in 
circumstances in which there was no indication that it was necessary for her to do so according to 
the available professional guidance [9, 12, 14]. 
 
The final concern over the Supreme Court’s approach to the assessment of clinical issues 
concerns the interpretation of the NICE guidelines as supporting elective caesarean sections 
without a clinical indication. Lady Hale says that the guideline  
‘clearly states that “For women requesting a CS, if after discussion and offer of support 
(including perinatal mental health support for women with anxiety about childbirth) a vaginal 
birth is still not an acceptable option, offer a planned CS”.’ (1 [2015] para 110)  
It is far from clear, however, that this implies that Nadine Montgomery should have been offered a 
caesarean section, bearing in mind that there was no a clinical indication for one. First, the 
evidence was that Dr McLellan had discussed mode of birth with her, as envisaged by the 
guideline and she did not express the view that vaginal birth was unacceptable (her claim that she 
asked about it was rejected by the trial judge) [7 paras 238-63]. Consequently, there was no 
indication to the doctor that the paragraph cited by Lady Hale was relevant to the situation. On the 
mother’s own evidence, she never asked for a CS [7 para 242]. Second, the passage quoted 
anticipates that had she continued to be anxious and renewed her request, the recommended 
response was an offer of support not a caesarean section. The offer of a planned section would be 
a secondary response, only to be considered if the first one was not acceptable to the woman. The 
guidance goes on to make it clear, although this was not noted by the Supreme Court, that it is not 
mandatory for doctors personally to provide such a surgical operation against their clinical 
judgment. Rather, they should refer to another obstetrician if a woman wished to pursue the option 
further. (NICE CG132 para 1.2.9.6)  
 
The whole structure of the section of the NICE guideline is therefore aimed to steer doctors and 
women away from decisions to choose caesarean sections, something that is needed because the 
risks are generally underestimated. Indeed, because of its risks, caesarean section is generally 
regarded as undesirable and is used by many guidelines, and the studies on which they are based, 
as a marker of an adverse outcome (for example when seeking to measure the effects of 
interventions during pregnancy) [13]. Discussion of elective CS is an area of hotly contested 
interpretations [16-20], and the Supreme Court, apparently unwittingly, has been drawn into this 
politics. The failure even to acknowledge this controversy suggests that the court either erred or 
was let down by counsel. Neither possibility suggests that litigation is well suited to interpreting 
clinical controversies. These weaknesses demonstrate the wisdom of the more limited approach to 
judicial scrutiny of professional judgments, enshrined in the Bolam test as developed in Maynard 
[21] and Bolitho [5], which discourages intervention into the politics of evidence unless professional 
opinions are clearly illogical. This takes us to the consideration of the nature of professional 
expertise. 
 
Conceptualising expertise 
  
In the previous leading case of Sidaway, which is effectively overruled in Montgomery, the majority 
of the House of Lords had been unpersuaded that different aspects of professional judgment 
should be judged against different legal standards. This position was put most explicitly by Lord 
Diplock, who thought doctors were under a  
‘single comprehensive duty… not subject to dissection into a number of component parts to 
which different criteria of what satisfy the duty of care apply, such as diagnosis, treatment 
and advice… In modern medicine and surgery such dissection of the various things a 
doctor has to do in the exercise of his (sic) whole duty of care owed to his (sic) patient is 
neither legally meaningful nor medically practicable’ [22:657-8]. 
 
In Montgomery, the Supreme Court took a very different approach. In its view, identifying possible 
investigatory or treatment options and risks of injury involved ‘is a matter falling within the expertise 
of members of the medical profession’ [1 para 83]. It argued that it was a non-sequitur to conclude 
that a decision on whether to discuss risks or alternative options was ‘a matter of purely 
professional judgment’ or ‘solely an exercise of medical skill’ (emphasis added) [1 para 83]. The 
Supreme Court justices believe that distinctions can be drawn between aspects of clinical practice. 
Some are ‘determined by medical learning or experience’, which become ‘schools of thought in 
medical science.’ Others, including ‘inclination to discuss risks’ are attributable ‘merely to divergent 
attitudes’ [1 para 84]. Different legal tests are to be applied depending on which category of case 
comes before the court and the Bolam test is applicable only to the first. The decision in 
Montgomery clearly excludes decisions on whether to disclose risks from the category of things 
‘determined by medical learning or experience’. On the other hand, assessing whether a disclosure 
would be detrimental to a patient’s health is described as an ‘exercise of medical judgment.’ More 
cases will be required to clarify the distinction. The Supreme Court also recognises that assessing 
whether patients prefer not to discuss issues and deciding how best to explain risks requires ‘skill 
and judgment.’ However, that falls outside the scope of Bolam, apparently because the 
judgements involved are not ‘dependent on medical expertise’ [1 para 85)].  
 
It is not clear what type of skill and judgment is being applied if it is not ‘medical’. Nor does the 
Court explain what test is to be used to assess whether such non-medical skills and judgments 
have been exercised appropriately. There is a radical shift from the position that everything that 
doctors do needs to be seen as ‘medical’ (the position in Sidaway [22]) to the position that unless 
every aspect of the decision is driven by ‘medical science’ it is not a matter of professional 
expertise. Neither position seems adequately to reflect the messiness of clinical interactions, which 
are rarely ‘purely’ anything. The idea that scientific evidence determines (rather than guides) 
decision-making has never been the philosophy of the Evidence-Based Medicine movement, 
which promotes ‘the conscientious, judicious and explicit use of current best evidence in making 
decisions about the care of individual patients’ [23]. To believe population-based science might 
determine individual clinical decisions underestimates the challenges of its ‘sheer volume’, which 
has made using clinical guidelines ‘both unmanageable and unfathomable’, and the very limited 
degree to which participants in trials actually resemble patients in clinics [24]. It also 
underestimates the contribution that values necessarily make to the production and use of 
evidence [25].  
 
Further, the idea that skills can be broken down into component parts is characteristic of the 
novice. Expert practice does not separate out the components of judgment but integrates them [4]. 
The transition from novice to expert is characterised by the tempering of technical knowledge with 
experiential learning [26, 27]. Influential reflections on the nature of artificial intelligence have 
suggested that separating technical assessments from judgement promotes a lower quality of 
decision-making, not a higher one [28]. This point has a long philosophical history and was 
described by Aristotle as ‘phronesis’ or practical wisdom – enabling judgment to be made about 
how to act in particular cases [29]. The Court’s approach relies, therefore, on a denial of the idea of 
professional expertise. It works in precisely the opposite direction to those who seek educate 
professionals to be experts rather than novices. By separating out ‘medical science’ as a separate 
and privileged category, the Supreme Court has turned the legal accountability for professional 
judgement into a cul-de-sac, similar to that in which Trish Greenhalgh has suggested the 
Evidence-Based Medicine has finds itself when it neglects the requirement for judgment in favour 
of a naive linear rationalism [24, 31]. 
 
 
Taking stock of the legal ruling 
 
 
On the face of it, the formulation of the legal doctrine seems relatively uncontroversial. Although 
there is scope to quibble with an analysis of Sidaway [22] in which the speech of Lord Scarman 
was transformed from a dissent into the leading judgment, it is clear that the Supreme Court was, 
in any event, entitled to overrule the majority approach. The ruling confirmed that health 
professionals are 
  
'under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material 
risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant 
treatments. The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a 
reasonable person in the patient's position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, 
or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to 
attach significance to it' [1 para 87]. 
  
This definition of the duty to disclose becomes problematic because of the way the Supreme Court 
applied it to the facts in the Montgomery case. It took upon itself to determine that a treatment was 
a ‘reasonable alternative’ in a way that is inherently unpredictable. It both departed from 
established guidelines and disregarded their evidential basis. As a result it seems to require 
professionals to advise on treatments that they do not regard as clinically appropriate, in a manner 
that is not wholly unprecedented [31], but is nevertheless in tension with the basic principle of 
medical law reaffirmed in Aintree [10] that choice of whether a treatment was clinically indicated 
should be for medical judgment, not patient or judicial determination. This seems a fundamental 
shift in approach, although it is not entirely clear that this was intentional. 
 
The Court held that deciding what information to disclose was not a matter of clinical expertise and 
therefore not to be judged against professional standards. However, this over-simplifies the nature 
of clinical interactions, as the history of the litigation in this case shows. The issue of informed 
consent did not emerge until the primary claim about the management of labour failed. The patient 
had not raised consent in her lengthy initial letter of complaint, prepared with the help of her sister 
who was a GP [7 para 255]. It was not mentioned in preliminary proceedings in 2007 [32]. It was at 
the trial, in 2010, that the patient raised informed consent issues, but at that stage the claim was 
that she had asked about the risks of vaginal delivery. This fell when the judge found her to be an 
unreliable witness [7 paras 238-63]. The case was only identified as raising the obligation to 
volunteer information in the Supreme Court proceedings. It is perhaps understandable that Dr 
McLellan failed to spot this fifteen years earlier when caring for Mrs Montgomery. Like the patient, 
she probably did not see any separate informed consent issue at the time. She had to make a 
series of interrelated judgements about risk, clinical options and support of the woman during her 
pregnancy. Under Montgomery, in order to understand her legal obligations, she would have 
needed to separate them out and consider them against different tests (albeit not yet clearly 
specified and certainly not identifiable in 1999). 
 
As legal doctrine, the Montgomery decision broadly incorporates GMC guidance on consent [33]. 
However, its application suggests a radical move away from English law's traditional respect for 
clinical expertise. If such a step is to be taken, courts need to be wary of being seduced into 
believing that the over-simplifications that legal processes require accurately reflect the 
complexities of clinical judgements. This is a trap the Supreme Court appears to have fallen into. 
Our argument does not suggest that the new legal disclosure test is inherently unsound. We do, 
however, identify problems that may undermine its predictability and call into question the rationale 
for the Supreme Court’s finding of liability. We also suggest that the approach taken by the 
Supreme Court may have implications well beyond the scope of information disclosure that are of 
considerable concern.  
 
This is not to say that an injustice has been done on the facts of the case. Whether or not the 
Supreme Court was correct to characterize Dr McLellan as driven by ideology to deceive her 
patient, she made a basic mathematical error in her calculation of the estimated fetal weight of 
Nadine Montgomery’s baby. Had she counted the days to the planned induction of labour correctly, 
she would have found that her estimation of the baby’s weight exceeded the 4kg threshold she had 
decided was an indication for CS in relation to the pregnancy [1 para 16]. She would, presumably, 
then have presented Nadine Montgomery with CS as an option that she supported and the course 
of the birth might have been very different. This was clearly a scientific error, but not one that a 
court would require ‘expertise’ to judge. 
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